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In recent years, several scholars of world politics have observed a relocation of authority in 
different issue areas of global policy-making. This development appears to be particularly evident 
in the field of global climate politics where a number of authors have highlighted the gradual loss 
of authority by national governments and the emergence of new spheres of authority dominated 
by actors other than the nation-state. In fact, due to the existence of a regulatory gap in this policy 
domain, various new governance arrangements have emerged which work simultaneously at 
different levels (some top-down and others bottom-up) to cope with the problem of climate 
change. However, despite several broader descriptions and mapping exercises, we have little 
systematic knowledge about their workings, let alone their impact on political-administrative 
systems. Given these shortcomings, in this paper we explore how (and how far) different types of 
globally operating governance arrangements have caused changes in the distribution of authority 
within national governments and their public administration. We will focus on two stylized 
governance arrangements: one that operates bottom-up (i.e. Transnational City Networks, TCNs) 
and another that operates top-down (i.e. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, REDD+). Departing from our hypotheses that the former is likely to lead to more 
decentralization and the latter to more centralization of environmental policy making, we will 
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1. Introduction: New Carbon Governance Arrangements and Public Authority1 
Scholars and practitioners alike agree that global climate governance has become highly 
complex in recent years. Given the difficulties among national governments in adopting 
effective means of implementation to cope with the issue of climate change, a plethora of 
new carbon governance arrangements has emerged during the past decade (Bulkeley 2010; 
Hoffmann 2011; Newell et al. 2012). These involve both state and non-state actors operating 
at different societal levels and within two stylized patterns. From the perspective of the 
nation-state, some work top-down (primarily driven by international institutions) and others 
work bottom-up (primarily driven by private or sub-national entities). These arrangements are 
assumed to initiate novel patterns of authority or even new spheres of authority (Rosenau 
1992; Rosenau 1997). 
The increasing institutional complexity of the global climate governance landscape has lately 
attracted the attention of numerous authors. While some discuss the pros and cons of 
fragmentation (Biermann et al. 2010; Zelli 2011; Zelli and van Asselt 2013) or highlight the 
development of a regime complex (Keohane and Victor 2011; Van de Graaf and De Ville 
2013), others emphasize the development of governance experiments (Hoffmann 2011), 
orchestration (Hale and Roger 2014) or a polycentric approach to global climate policy-
making (Ostrom 2010). Moreover, several authors (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Bäckstrand 
2008; Newell et al. 2012; Green 2014; Hickmann 2016) explicitly or implicitly assume that 
such institutional complexity is accompanied by a “reconfiguration of political authority across 
multiple levels and between public and private actors” (Bulkeley 2010: 231). The emergence 
of new spheres of authority implies that there is a vertical and/or horizontal devolution of the 
legitimate use of power, and that such authority is either deliberately delegated or transferred 
(Kahler and Lake 2003; Zürn 2013). 
However, despite several broader descriptions and mapping exercises of the various new 
carbon governance arrangements, we have little systematic knowledge about their workings 
within national jurisdictions, let alone their impact on political-administrative systems. In 
particular, we lack empirical studies on whether public authority has really shifted vertically or 
horizontally since the nation-state with its various administrative levels is often regarded as a 
black box in the field of global climate policy-making. While some studies have been carried 
out in OECD countries (Selin and VanDeveer 2012; Fisher 2013), hardly any research has 
been conducted in non-OECD countries with the exception of Brazil (Hochstetler and Viola 
2011). This lacking evidence is especially surprising, as most scholars would agree with the 
argument that governments and administrations are key when it comes to understanding the 
bottlenecks in global climate policy making (e.g. WBGU 2012). In this paper, we will address 
this research gap and explore the question of whether and to what extent different types of 
globally operating carbon governance arrangements generate changes in the distribution of 
public authority in developing countries. 
                                                
1
 Our research project on “Carbon Governance Arrangements and the Nation-State: The Reconfiguration of 
Public Authority in Developing Countries” is funded by the German Research Foudation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) (2015-2018) and carried out jointly by the authors at the University of Potsdam 
and the University of Münster. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we will sketch our conceptual and analytical 
framework. In Section 3 we will describe the two carbon governance arrangements we have 
selected for our analysis (i.e. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, REDD+ as well as Transnational City Networks, TCNs). In Section 4 we will 
present preliminary findings from our case studies in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South 
Africa, and draw conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Conceptual and Analytical Framework 
To what extent do carbon governance arrangements act as game changers that lead to a 
reconfiguration of public authority and how can we actually measure reconfigurations of 
authority? One could first think about a variety of functional as well as interest- and resource-
based explanations that focus theoretically on the role of international actors, on individual 
policy-makers and bureaucrats. In our research, we have chosen a two step approach for 
modeling and analyzing such reconfigurations triggered by globally operating governance 
arrangements in specific policy fields, in our case: climate policy, and more specifically in 
forest policy and urban climate policy (see below Section 3) in developing countries. 
In a first step, we depart from the idea that the type of carbon governance arrangement and 
its specific modus operandi matters for the way in which such a reconfiguration vis-à-vis 
national public administrations takes place. For example, while one governance arrangement 
may predominantly choose the national level, i.e. national governments and ministries as 
primary partners in its transnational cooperation, another may choose the sub-national level, 
with its governments and communities as beneficiaries. Given such differences, we thought 
that we should be able to observe the implications of such cooperation over time. Moreover, 
due to the (at times: massive) resource allocation of the international partners, we should 
expect changes in the quality of decision-making of the respective governments and possibly 
changes at the intergovernmental level. Consequently, and in a second step, we expected to 
be able to observe and analyze reconfigurations of authority through a varying degree of 
(de)centralization in specific policy fields and use it as a proxy for operationalizing and 
measuring the supposed changing patterns of authority. 
This has led us to two key assumptions: we expect that (i) the more resources are channeled 
via top-down governance arrangements and the more a specific country is involved with 
these arrangements, the more likely central governments will regulate, coordinate, and 
monitor, with the potential effect that the national level will be strengthened and former 
decentralization efforts will be reversed (conceptual assumption 1); (ii) the more resources 
are channeled via bottom-up governance arrangements in forest and urban policy-making 
and the more resources are channeled into climate-related activities undertaken by local 
governments, the more this will lead to decentralization in the recipient countries (conceptual 
assumption 2). Thus, in short, we suppose that top-down governance arrangements 
generate a trend towards more centralized decision-making, while bottom-up governance 
arrangements are expected to strengthen decentralization efforts in the field of forest and 
urban policy-making. 
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The literature on public sector decentralization provides particularly interesting insights when 
it comes to decision-making among different levels of government (Pollit 2005; Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007). In this strand of literature, decentralization is defined as the devolution of 
decision-making and expenditure authorities from central to regional and/or local government 
(Campbell and Fuhr 2004), or, in other words, devolving decision-making capacities from the 
top (Friberg et al. 2006). The bulk of this research has highlighted that instead of winning and 
losing authority, federal/national, district and local levels are very often required jointly to 
build their capacity and interact closely with each other in order to provide public services 
effectively and legitimately (Shah 2005; Fuhr 2012). Using decentralization as an adequate 
proxy for the abstract term reconfiguration of authority allows us to access a pool of 
established concepts to measure this change. 
Consequently, we will evaluate such the reconfiguration of public authority in developing 
countries in terms of a shift in the degree of (de)centralization (see above conceptual 
assumptions 1 and 2). More specifically, we will investigate whether there have been any 
discernible changes in the composition of responsibilities and competencies in forest and 
urban policy-making among central and sub-national governments. We will analyze the 
period from 2005 to 2015 (using 2005 as the base year for our observations).2 This will allow 
for inter-temporal as well as cross-sectional comparisons (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 44f). 
Furthermore, we expect to be able to ascertain the changes that our carbon governance 
arrangements have induced at the different levels involved. To do this, we will focus on three 
dimensions of decentralization that capture the division of competencies and responsibilities 
across different levels of government (Pollit 2005). In particular, we differentiate between 
three types of decentralization: (i) administrative, (ii) fiscal, and (iii) political decentralization. 
Administrative decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility, and financial 
resources for the provision of public services among different levels of government. Fiscal 
decentralization seeks to redistribute authority to raise revenues in favor of sub-national units 
(especially local governments) in order to carry out decentralized functions more 
independently. Political decentralization involves the devolution of power to citizens and their 
elected representatives. 
 
3. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Carbon Governance Arrangements 
Based on the above framework, we have chosen two globally operating carbon governance 
arrangements that are located at each end of the spectrum: one that operates top-down and 
one that operates bottom-up. Our first research object is the top-down governance 
arrangement Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) that 
was officially launched in 2007 to protect the remaining tropical forests (Lederer 2011; 
Lederer 2012b; Lederer 2012a). The fundamental principle behind REDD+ is to set proper 
incentives for developing countries to protect their forests from deforestation and 
                                                
2
 The year 2005 is an adequate starting point both for REDD+ and for TCNs. In 2005, forestry emerged in the 
international climate negotiations (COP 11 in Montreal) and reforestation started to become part of a post-Kyoto 
mechanism. In the same year, TCNs started becoming active in international climate policy and the C40 network 
held its first summit in London. 
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degradation, which is widely regarded as an essential and cost-effective means of mitigating 
climate change (Stern 2007; Eliasch 2008). REDD+ is largely driven by a variety of globally 
operating players working together, comprising both state and non-state actors. Our second 
research object concerns the emergence of transnational city networks (TCNs), representing 
a bottom-up governance arrangement that addresses the issue of climate change. TCNs can 
be generally defined as a non-hierarchical, horizontal, and polycentric cooperation between 
city governments across different countries (Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Kern and Bulkeley 
2009; Bulkeley and Betsill 2013). Established in the early 1990s (Campbell and Fuhr 2004), 
TCNs seek voluntary commitments from local authorities for reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (Schreurs 2008; Bulkeley 2010). Mostly using their own resources, TCNs 
act as policy entrepreneurs and agenda-setters, trying to overcome the constraints imposed 
by national and international administrative decision-making, partisan politics, and political 
timetables (Acuto 2013). 
The two carbon governance arrangements, REDD+ and TCNs, are of interest from both a 
scholar’s and a practitioner’s perspective. Theoretically, the analysis of REDD+ and TCNs is 
relevant since both arrangements are located at opposite ends of the spectrum comprising 
top-down and bottom-up approaches. We thus expect to observe different impacts in terms 
of how reconfigurations of public authority work in practice. Moreover, the findings will also 
lay the groundwork for ascertaining whether such governance arrangements result in 
significant policy changes that many scholars have assumed take place. The latter step is 
highly relevant to practitioners since there is little knowledge about the effects the numerous 
initiatives might have on a country’s administrative capacity and whether the large 
investments currently underway make a significant difference on the ground. 
 
Case Selection 
In our co-variational analysis (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 42; King et al. 1994: 137f.), we 
compare countries that exhibit REDD+/ TCN activities with countries where no such activities 
take place, or where only low activity is present. We have also included one country where 
both activities are present to initially assess whether and how the expected trends 
(recentralization in forestry and decentralization in urban climate change activities) potentially 
have contradictory effects on the overall field of environmental policy-making. Given our 
focus on the global South, our universe of cases comprises all developing countries with 
regard to the presence of the two governance arrangements under investigation. In an 
attempt to control for the existing degree of decentralization, we have only chosen countries 
with a similar level of decentralization (see first row in Table 1). 
In addition, we differentiate between those countries that are significantly involved in either 
REDD+ or TCNs (see the first two columns in Table 1), those countries that have a 
significant involvement in both governance arrangements (see column three in Table 1) and 
those where neither the one nor the other is significant (see column four in Table 1). In the 
first row the case selected not only serves as a case for studying the influence of REDD+ 
activities, it also constitutes a crucial control case for a country not involved in significant 
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TCNs activities (similarly, the same holds for the country in column two that is not actively 
engaged in REDD+). The country in the third column might allow us to observe both effects 
at the same time but playing out in different sectors (urban activities vs. forestry), and the 
country in the last column serves as another control case. 
 
REDD+ and TCNs 
We define ‘significant REDD+ activities’ as funds directed towards national readiness and 
implementation actions of REDD+ until November 2015, which amount to more than US$ 20 
million.3 For being able to see actual changes on the ground, REDD+ funding which totals 
less than US$ 20 million per country is regarded as too little to lead to changes as 
hypothesized in our research design. The Voluntary REDD+ Database (FAO 2016) provides 
information on delivered funding for environmental actions. It is supposed to present only 
financial means that are for the purpose of domestic REDD+ actions. But as every 
stakeholder is free to provide this voluntary information, a lot of non-REDD+ funding is listed 
in this database. However, it is the most comprehensive one and was therefore used to 
categorize countries. All information being used were compiled as presented by donors and 
crosschecked with data presented by the respective recipient countries. In order to qualify as 
REDD+ funding, the project description had to mention REDD+ actions as project activities. 
We have chosen C40 amongst other TCNs because we expect to be able to examine 
significant shifts in the redistribution of authority after cities have become a member in the 
C40 group due to the groups’ noteworthy influence on enabling sub-national networking 
across countries. C40 consists of more than 80 of the world’s largest cities and empowers 
cities to “connect with each other and share technical expertise on best practices” (C40 
2016a). Out of the countries that have member cities in the C40 group, we selected those 
where at least two cities are active members with significant activities, because only then we 
can make significant statements about policy diffusion processes that support developments 
towards a decentralization of the policy field. Active membership is defined by whether a city 
effectively implements at least one project initiated by C40 and conducted in collaboration 
with the network. Information on project activities were compiled from the C40 website (C40 
2016a) and by an online search (November 2015). City projects which are listed on the 
website, but do not mention any involvement of C40 were not regarded as C40 projects. 
 
Our Cases 
As Table 1 indicates, we have chosen Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa as case 
study countries. The four selected countries have significant forest and woodland cover (less 
so in South Africa) and mega-cities with potentially huge climate change impacts, which 
makes them relevant for research. 
 
                                                
3
 Data were compiled prior to COP 21 to the UNFCCC held in Paris in order to have a pre-Paris-Agreement 
overview of REDD+ and C40 activities. 
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Table 1: Case Selection 
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In the ‘significant REDD+ activity, but less than two active cities in C40’ column, Indonesia is 
the most active country. According to the Voluntary REDD+ Database, various bilateral and 
multilateral donors have made funding commitments of about US$ 530 million during the last 
years (Norway, Germany, Australia, USA, UK, Denmark, Italy, FIP, FCPF, UN-REDD). Only 
Brazil was promised more funding on REDD+. Jakarta is the only Indonesian city that is an 
active member in C40 and implements a C40 project on clean buses. Besides this one 
project, it has not participated in any major C40 initiative. 
In the ‘no significant REDD+ activity, but at least two active cities in C40’ column, South 
Africa stands out. Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Tshwane are C40 members. 
Johannesburg hosts three C40-sponsored projects, the ‘Climate Proofing of Urban 
Communities’ Project, the Green City Bond, and the Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit System. 
Cape Town has been a C40 observer city until recently, but joined the network in 2014. 
Together with Tshwane, Cape Town joined a C40 Clean Bus initiative in the same year. 
Durban only obtained its full membership status in 2015, and has so far no C40 sponsored 
project in place. Forests cover 7.6% of South Africa’s total land area, 33% of the countries is 
covered by woodlands. Donors have pledged little more than US$ 300,000 for REDD+ 
activities in South Africa and the country does not participate in the program. 
In the ‘significant REDD+ activity and at least two active cities in C40’ column, Brazil is 
clearly the most important global player when it comes to tropical forests. Containing 13% of 
the world’s forests, the country has the second largest forest area in the world and various 
donors have pledged about US$ 890 of REDD+ funds to Brazil’s government. The cities of 
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São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, and Salvador are members of C40 and have 
implemented numerous projects in cooperation with the network. São Paulo can furthermore 
be described as a frontrunner city when it comes to climate change adaptation and mitigation 
and has influenced national policy making by its ambitious emission reduction targets. 
In the ‘no significant REDD+ activity and less than two active cities in C40’ category, we have 
selected India as a control case. Although 23 % of India’s land area is covered by forest and 
even though its government has (successfully) influenced international REDD+ negotiations, 
it has not participated in any multilateral REDD+ program. Donors pledged about US$ 17 
million to India, but besides the USA no other major bilateral donor is very active there. It has 
received grants and loans from Japan but only for technical assistance and we do not expect 
any impact on shifts in public authority. Five of its cities participate in C40 (Mumbai, Delhi, 
Kolkata, Bangalore, Jaipur), but neither has a project.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In the following sub-section, we will summarize the initial findings from our desk studies on 
the four selected countries. They provide the background for our more detailed empirical 
studies, which will take place in these countries during 2016 and 2017. In each sub-section, 
we will provide an overview of forest governance issues and review existing urban climate 
policies. In this manner, we will investigate whether significant shifts among levels of 
government have been taking place during our observation period from 2005 to 2015. 
 
4.1 Indonesia 
The Republic of Indonesia is a three tier political system, which has been characterized as 
decentralized since the Regional Governance Law 22 of 1999 (Bünte 2008: 38). Indonesia is 
an archipelagic country, which is highly vulnerable to climate change. However, it is also the 
fifth largest GHG emitting country in the world, accumulating almost 2 Gt CO2eq in 2012, 
from which 61,6% were released by deforestation only (Anderson et al. 2016: 31; WRI 2016). 
Indonesia has one of the world’s highest deforestation rates that resulted in the reduction of 
its forest cover from 65.4% of the land surface in 1990 to 50.2% in 2015 (Indrarto et al. 2012: 
1, 43; World Bank 2016). But cities have also become major sources of GHG emissions in 
Indonesia, due to a high urbanization rate and increasing fossil fuel based energy use 
(Colenbrander et al. 2015: 25, 31). The annual GHG emissions of the capital city of Jakarta, 
for instance, already amount to 44.6 Mt CO2eq (Sugar et al. 2013: 103). 
 
Forest Governance in Indonesia 
The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 determines that land and their natural resources are 
under state control. Based on the Forestry Law 5 of 1967, the central government declared 
almost 75% of the land to be state forest (Brockhaus et al. 2012: 32). The Regional 
Governance Law of 1999 then provided districts with the competences to manage their forest 
resources and to issue timber extraction permits (Indrarto et al. 2012: 27-28; Ardiansyah et 
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al. 2015a: 6). This led to extensive logging by companies, despite the Forestry Law 41 of 
1999, which authorized the Ministry of Forestry to manage the state forest (Indrarto et al. 
2012: 27-28; Ardiansyah et al. 2015a: 35, 79). In 2002, the Government Regulation 34 finally 
ended this practice by assigning the authority for the issuance of logging permits to the 
Ministry of Forestry. However, the Estate Crops Law 18 of 2004 gave sub-national leaders 
the right to issue estate crop permits outside state forests, which led to an expansion of 
plantations and further deforestation (Indrarto et al. 2012: 11, 28, 31-32). Finally, the 
Regional Governance Law of 2014 centralized forestry and restricted the role of districts to 
managing grand forest parks (Anderson et al. 2016: 31; Ardiansyah et al. 2015a: 7, 35). 
During the government of President Yudhoyono, REDD+ and climate change was put at the 
top of the national agenda (Ardiansyah et al. 2015a: 13) and most of the elements of the 
national REDD+ and climate policy framework were defined as presidential matters. The 
government strengthened authority at the national level by creating new institutions, such as 
the National Council on Climate Change in 2008 and the REDD+ Task Force within the 
President’s Office in 2010 which was replaced by the REDD+ Agency in 2013 (Resosudarmo 
et al. 2013: 77, 79-80; Agung et al. 2014: 755). This led to a struggle about the institutional 
lead on climate change between the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of National 
Planning, the REDD+ Task Force and the National Council of Climate Change which 
contributed to the weak implementation of climate change policies (Resosudarmo et al. 2013: 
79-80, 82, 86-87; Ardiansyah et al. 2015b: 119). In 2015, the new President Widodo stopped 
this institutional turf war by integrating the REDD+ Agency and the National Council of 
Climate Change in the new Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Anderson et al. 2016: 33). 
The President also strengthened central government’s authority by enacting new policies, 
strategies, and regulations. He eventually surprised the nation by pledging to reduce 
Indonesia’s GHG emissions by 26% compared to business-as-usual scenarios in 2020 and 
by 41% with global support (Indrarto et al. 2012: 50; Brockhaus et al. 2012: 30). Moreover, 
he signed a letter of intent with Norway in 2010 which promised Indonesia up to US$ 1 billion 
for verified REDD+ activities (Luttrell et al. 2014: 67). Out of this agreement emerged in 2011 
the two-year presidential moratorium on new forest licenses for areas outside and inside 
state forests, thus interfering with sub-national affairs, which has since then been renewed 
twice (Anderson et al. 2016: 33; Ardiansyah et al. 2015b: 117; Indrarto et al. 2012: 67). 
Thus, the forestry sector has been characterized by a constant and increasing degree of 
centralization since 2002. The development of the REDD+ framework since 2010 may have 
intensified this centralization trend, as authority has been strengthened at central 
government level through presidential decrees. Moreover, the increase of authority at the 
provincial level has only been within the limits of the national REDD+ framework, while 
districts have mostly been sidelined during our observation period. 
 
City Governance in Indonesia 
Before the country’s decentralization policy in 1999, Indonesia was characterized by a very 
centralistic planning process as defined in the Spatial Planning Law of 1992 (Moeliono 2011: 
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88-89, 91, 135). After decentralization, however, the central and provincial governments lost 
significant power to the cities in many policy fields (Moeliono 2011: 135, 140-141). In 
addition, changes in fiscal relations led to an allocation of 61.5% of total country’s revenues 
to sub-national governments in the budget of the year 2001, instead of only seven percent in 
the past (Firman 2002: 239). 
By 2004, provinces and cities were responsible for development and spatial planning, 
business, environment, and infrastructure – i.e. policy fields with impacts on urban GHG 
emissions (ROI 2004: 9-10). With regard to taxes, spatial planning drafts, and regulations 
concerning the annual budget, a hierarchy between the government layers was also 
reintroduced as lower tiers regulations and drafts could be revoked from higher ones 
(Moeliono 2011: 168-169). 
After 2005, however, a trend towards centralization started. The Spatial Planning Law of 
2007 strengthened the provinces alongside the cities, while stipulating a hierarchical top-
down spatial planning system with guidance and directives from the upper governmental tiers 
as well as approval and review mechanism with regard to lower tiers’ plans (Moeliono 2011: 
182-183, 186). In 2007, central government’s competences were further enlarged by the 
Government Regulation 38, which determined that governmental affairs, which had formerly 
belonged entirely to the authority of sub-national governments, would henceforth be jointly 
shared with the central government. Furthermore, sub-national governments have been 
obliged to follow central government’s norms and procedures, while the central government 
even gained the authority to take over the provision of obligatory sub-national governmental 
affairs, such as environment, public works, development planning, housing, enterprises, land 
issues, and space layout, in case the provinces or districts are not ensuring a minimum 
service standard as defined by the central government (ROI 2007: 4-5, 8-10). 
Climate change started to gain momentum on the Indonesian urban development agenda 
from 2007 onwards due to the organization of the UNFCCC conference in Bali and the 
political leadership of President Yudhoyono (Ardiansyah et al. 2015a: 13). At this time, 
Indonesian cities and provinces were already equipped with comprehensive competences in 
climate related policy fields. The capital city of Jakarta joined C40 in 2007 (Susanti 2011: 24), 
but it has remained quite modest in its network activities so far, as it has not participated in 
any of the seven major C40 initiatives and has only taken part in one C40 mitigation project 
on clean buses (C40 2015a: 1-2; C40 2016b). Jakarta has been more active in terms of 
attending workshops on topics like sustainable communities, green buildings, and bus rapid 
transit (C40 2012; C40 2013a; C40 2013b). 
During the observation period, a recentralization trend could be observed which already 
started in 2005 and continued until 2007, while henceforth remaining largely constant until 
the Regional Governance Law of 2014. This law basically incorporates all the developments 
of the preceding laws and regulations, while clarifying the hierarchical relations of the 
governmental tiers, assigning to higher ones more possibilities to act and to intervene than to 
lower ones, thus indicating a further strengthening of the previous recentralization trend (ROI 
2014: Article 7-13, 16-18). Hence, it is apparent that the central government’s influence in 
urban climate policies has expanded in the past few years. Provinces have also gained more 
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urban and climate governance authority than cities, while being constrained by the national 
framework. Consequently, the very modest C40 participation of Jakarta did apparently have 
little impact on the decentralization of climate change related policy fields. On the contrary, 
the central government has remained the central player in climate politics so far. 
 
4.2 South Africa 
South Africa is by its Constitution of 1996 a quasi-federal multi-level government and is 
divided into a national, a provincial, and a local sphere, which are “distinctive, interdependent 
and interrelated” (RSA 1996). The Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces, representing the interests of nine elected provincial 
governments (Cameron 2012). The local sphere currently consists of 278 municipalities, 
eight of them metropolitan, 44 district and 226 local municipalities. South Africa’s economy is 
highly emissions intensive, its national GHG emissions in 2012 added up to 0.47 GT of 
CO2eq, mainly caused by mining, heavy industry, and high levels of energy consumption 
(WRI 2016). To support economic growth, the government subsidized fossil fuel based 
energy generation until 2009, leading to the cheapest electricity prices in the world (Edkins et 
al. 2010; Baker et al. 2014). The International Energy Agency estimates that 94% of South 
Africa’s electricity is generated from domestically produced coal (IEA 2015; Climate Action 
Tracker 2015b). The country’s GHG emissions from land-use change (including 
deforestation) only contribute to 5% of the country’s total GHG emissions (RSA 2011). 
Afforestation is considered as a short-term option for emission reduction, but the potential to 
cut emissions is comparably low. 
 
Forest Governance in South Africa 
Natural forests in South Africa only cover about 0.5% of land in total, plantation forestry 
covers about 1%, and woodlands collectively cover about 33%. Between 2005 and 2015 
there has been no record of a change in forest cover (RSA 2015). The majority of South 
African forests are commercial plantations, with 70% of them being privately owned and 30% 
owned by the government. Communities without formal tenure rights occupy 33% of state 
lands and an unknown number of private lands (RSA 2015). The forest sector in South Africa 
falls under national legislative competence, with the exception of several state forests whose 
management has been delegated to provincial governments (FAO 2004). Forest 
management in South Africa still bears traces of the country’s colonial and apartheid history, 
which administered forests through hierarchical line management in the government’s 
departments and ignored community needs, who were in most parts of the country excluded 
from the use and access of natural forests (Grundy and Wynberg 2001). Therefore, South 
Africa’s new Constitution stresses the right of access to environmental resources and (in its 
bill of rights) guarantees every citizen of South Africa the right to a healthy environment and 
protection of the environment (RSA 1996). 
The constitutional decree was implemented through a series of policies and laws. The 
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998 stipulates the involvement of 
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communities in conservation activities (RSA 1998). Further legislation was the National 
Forestry Action Program of 1997 (NFAP) and the National Forests Act of 1998 (NFA). The 
NFA provides for the devolution of authority on forest management to local communities, but 
reserves forest ownership to the national government without granting formal rights to 
communities, thus pursuing a strategy of co-management (Alden Wily 2002; Rahlao et al. 
2012; Brown 2009). Communities are granted the right to apply to manage any forest by 
agreement with the national government, which maintains the supreme authority over 
licensing and managing the forest (RSA 1998). The Forest Law has been amended in 2004 
by a participatory forest management regime that regulates the management of forests 
through local user groups in more detail (Brown 2009; RSA 2004b). It also provides 
directives on the privatization of forests in South Africa and specifies the inclusion of local 
communities in privatization (Mayers et al. 2001). 
In spite of such provisions, the political procedures remain largely unchanged and the power 
of granting community forestry concessions still remains with the national level. There is 
practically no evidence for a transfer of management rights to community management 
entities in the fiscal year 2013/14 (RSA 2004b) or for the integration of forestry programs into 
provincial and municipal development plans (RSA 2013). At the local level, power structures 
on the management of forests seem to remain unchanged and communities are denied 
access to forests in several cases (Matose and Watts 2010). This would support the 
accusation often addressed to South Africa of having progressive policies but falling behind 
when it comes to their implementation. Most relevant for the focus of our paper, political 
administrative structures in South Africa remain largely unchanged in the forest sector in the 
period from 2005 to 2015. 
 
City Governance in South Africa 
South Africa’s biggest cities are Johannesburg (4.4 million), Cape Town (3.4 million 
inhabitants), and Durban (3.1 million). About 60% of the country’s population live in urban 
areas, most of which suffer from infrastructural deficiencies that still result from the 
negligence of townships during the apartheid regime. South African cities are therefore 
facing major development challenges (Pasquini and Shearing 2014). In addition to rapidly 
expanding informal settlements, an increasing demand for basic services and challenges in 
the transportation sector, cities are extremely vulnerable to the adverse effects associated 
with climate change (Cameron 2012; RSA 1996). The decentralization of powers and 
functions to local governments by the Constitution of 1996 gives cities substantial 
responsibilities. One of the most conflicting issues in environmental urban governance in 
South Africa is the matter of energy policy. While electricity distribution is a core municipal 
function, a large degree of authority on energy issues remains at the national level and 
municipalities have to purchase their electricity from Eskom, the one and only state-owned 
enterprise that provides electricity in South Africa (Jaglin 2014). Licenses for renewable 
energy sources have to be requested from the National Energy Regulator (NERSA). 
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During the past few years, South African cities have increasingly participated in transnational 
city networks. Johannesburg is still facing serious challenges in terms of taking action on 
climate change, but has implemented several infrastructure programs, such as, for example, 
the railway connection between Pretoria and Johannesburg and the public transportation 
system in Johannesburg. Johannesburg has been a C40 member since 2006 and hosted the 
C40 Summit in 2014. Moreover, at COP 21 it won the C40 Award for issuing a green bond 
index to attract green local investors (C40 2015e). In 2009, the city established the 
Johannesburg Climate Change Adaptation Plan (CCAP) with subsequent adaptation 
activities, including a Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Management Plan and a disaster 
response mechanism (City of Johannesburg 2015). The city’s administration has also 
ensured the integration of climate change as a cross-cutting issue. 
Cape Town is the second largest economic hub after Johannesburg and is often cited as a 
best practice case in sustainable urban development (Holgate 2007). The city is a member of 
ICLEI and became a member of the C40 group in 2014. Besides establishing a rapid bus 
system, the city has undertaken climate action in the buildings, transport, waste, and energy 
sectors (CDP Cities Report 2013). In 2006, Cape Town was the first South African City that 
approved an Energy and Climate Change Strategy. It adopted institutional changes that 
ensured ownership, professional management and accountability. Moreover it established 
innovative features such as ‘Energy for a Sustainable City’ and the ‘Energy and Climate 
Change Committee’ (City of Cape Town 2011). 
Durban, is the largest port city on Africa’s East Coast, and an early adapter of local action on 
climate change (Roberts 2010). The city has been a member of ICLEI since 1994, joined the 
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) in 2000 and the C40 group in 2015. In 2003, Durban 
developed a GHG inventory and in 2006, Durban’s city leaders launched an adaptation 
strategy, which has been updated ever since for several times, addressing the planning for 
water resources, human health and disaster risk management. The main institutional actor 
was the Environmental Planning and Climate Protection Department (EPCPD). Founded in 
1994, the department has increased its staff from one single employee to nowadays 21 
employees, and gained considerable political influence (Roberts 2010). 
While environmental departments or task forces have been set up in all of the three South 
African Cities, it is difficult at this juncture to ascertain whether these developments can be 
ascribed to the growing influence of transnational city networks or whether they are merely a 
reaction to the growing body of national legislation on climate change which assigns 
municipalities several duties in regard to climate change adaptation and mitigation (RSA 
2011; RSA 2004a; RSA 2012). 
 
4.3 Brazil 
Brazil consists of 26 federal states and one federal district that are divided into 5,561 
municipalities. Since the 1980s, the Brazilian government has undergone major 
decentralization reforms and has evolved to one of the most fiscally decentralized countries 
in Latin America (Gregersen et al. 2004). The Constitution of 1988 allocates competencies 
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and legislative authority between all three levels of government that have the common duty 
to preserve an ‘ecologically balanced environment’, which includes forest and natural 
resource management (Gebara et al. 2014; Brazil 1988). With more than 206 million 
inhabitants, Brazil is the fifth largest country of the world, both in size of area and population. 
Environ 85% of Brazil’s population live in urban areas. Being among the world’s top ten GHG 
emitters, Brazil’s emission profile is unique compared to other emerging economies but 
similar to that of Indonesia. The main share of the country’s total emissions of 2 Gt CO2e in 
2005 did not result from energy consumption, but from enormous deforestation in the 
Amazon, mostly due to cattle and soy production activities (Viola 2013; WRI 2016). In 2005, 
AFOLU emissions accounted for approximately 77% of the total CO2 emissions of the 
country, while only 16% were caused by the energy sector (Viola 2013; Brazil 2013). For that 
reason, Brazil intends to achieve its pledges to reduce its GHG emissions mainly by reducing 
deforestation (Climate Action Tracker 2015a; Brazil 2009). 
 
Forest Governance in Brazil 
Until the end of the military regime in 1984, forest management in Brazil was highly 
centralized (Banerjee et al. 2009). With the establishment of the democratic government and 
the adoption of the constitution in 1988, state governments gained profound autonomy, 
mostly through fiscal decentralization. But while resources and tax raising authorities were 
transferred to the state governments, functions were not sufficiently clarified or remained at 
the central level (Gregersen et al. 2004). Within the forestry sector, weak law enforcement 
and missing transparency led to exploding rates of deforestation and timber exploitation and 
the distribution of land titles were subject to criminality and corruption (Rajão et al. 2012). In 
1995, Brazil’s deforestation crisis peaked with an annual deforestation rate of about 29,000 
km²; representing 0.8% of the remaining forest cover (INPE 2008). Increasing domestic 
pressure and international attention forced governments to take action, above all the central 
government. 
In 2004, for example, the government formulated the National Plan to Prevent and Control 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (PPCDAm) and set up a highly advanced monitoring 
system (DETER—Detection of Deforestation in Real Time) at the National Institute for Space 
Research (INPE). It allowed to track deforestation in real time and strengthened law 
enforcement on deforestation in the Amazon (Assunção et al. 2012; Caviglia-Harris et al. 
2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2016; Brazil 2004). The Plan also centralized the responsibility in the 
matter of Amazon deforestation in the president’s office to facilitate inter-ministerial 
coordination and collaboration and improve the integration of the federal police and the 
public prosecutor for law enforcement (Nepstadt et al. 2014). Moreover, the Brazilian Public 
Forest Law has regulated the establishment of public forests and created the Brazilian Forest 
Service (SFB) since 2006 (Brazil 2006). The SFB has been assigned to execute several 
functions IBAMA had once administered, and has mandated to establish decentralized 
structures of forest management (Bauch et al. 2009). 
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The new regulations and institutional changes significantly contributed to the remarkable 
decrease in deforestation from 2005 onwards (Assunção et al. 2012). Additional factors that 
contributed to the decrease of deforestation rates were a soy moratorium, which banished 
producers growing soy on land cleared after 2006, and the Critical Counties Program of 2007 
(Nepstadt et al. 2014; Inoué 2012). Brazil’s National Policy on Climate Change was approved 
in 2009. The forestry sector is expected to provide the major contribution for the national 
emission reductions by two goals: The achievement of zero net loss of forest cover by 2015 
and zero illegal deforestation, which should be reached by integrating climate change 
policies and existing regulations to control deforestation (Brazil 2009; Di Gregorio et al. 
2016). To reach these targets, the government established the Amazon Fund comprising 
US$ 1 billion, which is the country’s largest climate fund. Projects are supported by non-
reimbursable investments to monitor, prevent, and combat deforestation through 
performance-based payments. By the end of 2015, the Fund had approved 80 projects with 
an amount of US$ 566 million, out of which US$ 223 million have been disbursed (Amazon 
Fund 2016). 
The most recent forest policy document is the National REDD+ strategy whose formulation 
process started in 2010. It was established by the Executive Group on Climate Change 
(GEx) under the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change (CIM), the Inter-Ministerial 
Working Group on REDD+ (GT REDD+), as well as the REDD+ Task Force (TF), and was 
published shortly before the start of COP 21 in October 2015. The strategy defines a number 
of objectives regarding governance structures and the allocation of functions between the 
three levels of government as well as the integration and coordination in respect to existing 
policies (Fatorelli et al. 2015; Brazil 2015b). The process and its final outcome demonstrate 
the tensions between central government and the federal states that exist in Brazil 
concerning forest governance (Jagger et al. 2014). Prior to the start of the policy formulation 
process, Amazon governors joined in the multi-jurisdictional Governors’ Climate and Forest 
Task Force (GCF) to add some weight to their claims concerning REDD+ at the national 
level. They advocated a ‘nested approach’ to REDD+ financing and urged for the 
establishment of sub-national programs, arguing that the engagement of stakeholders at the 
state and local level would improve participation and transparency (May et al. 2011). 
The state governments took a lead in activities for the implementation of REDD+ initiatives 
even before the national strategy got published, but requested access to funds from REDD+ 
for improving their institutional capacity and executing the roles ascribed to them by 
decentralization (Fatorelli et al. 2015; May et al. 2011; Duchelle et al. 2014). Moreover, the 
state governments pushed for having a say regarding the decentralization of regulation and 
for increased representation in several executive bodies (GCF 2014). In spite of these 
efforts, however, the outcome can so far not be considered a victory for Brazil’s federal 
states. Only two state governments are permanent members in the National Commission for 
REDD+, but what will presumably cause even further dispute is the rejection to use 
international offsetting mechanisms by Brazil, a fact that will undermine existing 
Memorandum of Understandings on carbon trading between Amazon states and foreign 
governments (Di Gregorio et al. 2016; Brazil 2015a). 
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The results regarding our conceptual assumptions are mixed, mostly due to the fact that the 
legal and institutional landscape in the forestry sector in Brazil is highly fragmented. On the 
one hand, legal amendments have improved the decentralization of forest management and 
community participation. The national government apparently does not attempt to revoke the 
decentralization of forest management authority. On the other hand, one can also observe 
that while the national government transfers forest protection and management functions to 
state governments, it refuses to grant the federal states with direct access to REDD+ funds 
and has centralized monitoring, reporting, and verification mechanisms. At the same time, 
state governments have been pushing for a further decentralization of powers and REDD+ 
funds and joined up with other regional governments in the GCF. 
 
City Governance in Brazil 
The two largest cities in Brazil are São Paulo with 12 million inhabitants and Rio de Janeiro 
with 6.5 million inhabitants (IBGE 2015). The urbanization rate is expected to grow in the 
years to come, a fact that makes cities an important player in national politics and at the 
same time forces them to adapt infrastructure, energy supply, and transportation systems, 
and respond to environmental risks caused amongst other things by the coastal location of 
Brazil’s major cities (Fernandes 2007). Similar to the forest sector, the Constitution of 1988 
provided the basis for enabling urban reform and municipal autonomy with the chapter on 
urban policy (Brazil 1988). A public consultation process resulted in amending the chapter by 
environmental, social, and property-related aspects, and several municipalities implemented 
ground-breaking policies under public participation. While Brazil gained international 
recognition for this model, the urban reform process has been slowed down due to a lack of 
federal legislation and the opposition of certain interest groups (Fernandes 2007). 
Most of the major Brazilian cities have implemented municipal plans to reduce emissions and 
set up councils for urban climate action (Kahn and Brandão 2015). São Paulo joined ICLEI in 
1994 and was a founding member of the C40 group in 2005 (Johnson et al. 2015). In 2003, 
the city established its first GHG inventory with estimated annual emissions of 15 million tons 
CO2 eq. A major share of emissions was generated by the energy sector with 76% of total 
emissions, whereof 89% were generated by road transport. The solid waste sector generated 
23% of the city’s emissions (Johnson et al. 2015). In 2005, the city initiated the policy-making 
process for a climate change policy with the establishment of a Municipal Committee on 
Climate Change and Sustainable Economy that represented actors from civil society, 
academia, municipal and state governments, and environmental organizations (Barbi and da 
Costa Ferreira 2013). The climate policy that São Paulo adopted thereupon in 2009 was very 
proactive and inspired both the state and national climate change policies by setting the 
concrete goal for a GHG emission reduction of 30% compared to emission levels from 2005 
to 2010 (São Paulo 2009). The policy encompasses concrete action plans for mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change and the implementation follows a cross-cutting, multi-sectoral 
approach (Barbi and da Costa Ferreira 2013; Romeiro and Parente 2011). Several other 
climate-related policies have been adopted since then, targeting public transportation and 
traffic, energy efficiency in buildings, and solid waste management and the city has 
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implemented different projects in collaboration with C40 on Solid Waste, Clearn 
Transportation, and Green Economic Development (C40 2015). 
Rio de Janeiro is the second largest city of Brazil. Following the example of São Paulo, it 
established a municipal Forum on Climate Change in 2009 which led to the adaption of the 
city’s Climate Change policy in 2011 and a pledge to reduce its GHG emissions by 8% until 
2012, 16% until 2016 and 20% until 2020 (Rio de Janeiro 2011). Rio joined the C40 network 
in 2006 and has implemented projects in collaboration with C40 in four out of the seven C40 
categories on Solid Waste, Clean Transportation, and Sustainable Urban Development (C40 
2015g; Cohen 2010). A further relevant city is Curitiba that was one of the first cities to 
implement ambitious and sustainable public transport systems and serves as a best practice 
for many other members of the C40 network. It is also a C40 innovator city due to its 
longstanding experience with sustainable urban solutions (C40 2015d). The city has 
implemented projects in six out of seven C40 categories. Beyond that, Salvador is also a 
member city and joined C40 in 2014. 
With regard to our conceptual assumptions described above, it seems important to note that 
the achievements in urban development in Brazil have mostly emerged due to efforts from 
the local level and faced a strong opposition from the central level (Fernandes 2007). Urban 
action on climate change can hence be described as originating at the bottom and scaling 
up. But although urban governments have received far-reaching competencies since 1988, 
several important sectors remain under the exclusive competence of the national 
government; namely energy sources, energy generation and pricing (Setzer 2009; 
Fernandes 2007). Nonetheless, cities in Brazil can be described as frontrunners in climate 
change adaptation and mitigation, overtaking the nation-state in climate change regulation 
and initiating the diffusion of good examples that have inspired other cities and states. 
 
4.4 India 
India’s federal political system is characterized by three governmental tiers and a strong role 
for the central government (Wagner 2006: 87-89). Accumulating almost 2.9 Gt CO2eq in 
2012 (including land-use change and forestry), India ranks third among global emitting 
countries (WRI 2016). One of India’s main GHG emission drivers is the power sector which 
contributed 32% of total GHG emissions in 2010 (excluding land-use change and forestry) 
(Climate Action Tracker 2016), while lands and forests rather serve as carbon sinks, having 
removed 127 Mt CO2eq in 2012 (WRI 2016). Despite the expansion of India’s forest cover 
from 21.5% of land area in 1990 to 23.7% in 2015 (World Bank 2016), many experts doubt 
that deforestation has halted and criticize that 40% of the forest area is degraded or under-
stocked (Prip and Wallbott 2014: 24). The role of cities as GHG emitters is still rising, as 
India’s urban population is projected to increase from 400 million to 800 million by 2050, 
while many of them are also highly vulnerable to climate change (Beermann et al. 2016: 1, 
4). Delhi and Greater Mumbai are already major GHG emitters (38.6 Mt CO2eq and 22.8 Mt 
CO2eq) (Ramachandra et al. 2015: 473, 489-490). 
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Forest Governance in India 
The British colonial Forest Act of 1927 and rulings by the Indian government after 
independence allowed the highest governmental tier to declare land as state forest, leading 
to a nationalization of 97 % of the forest area (Kashwan 2015: 100; Madhu 2005: 2131; Prip 
and Wallbott 2014: 24). While the national government increased its authority on forestry 
issues henceforward by the centralization of key aspects of forest administration in 1975 and 
the passing of the Forest Conservation Act in 1980 (Kashwan 2015: 100; Fleischman 2015: 
3), the National Forest Policy of 1988 sought to involve local communities in the 
management of forests (Aggarwal et al. 2009: 6). The central government issued Joint Forest 
Management Guidelines in 1990. It helped ‘State Forest Departments’ to commonly manage 
forests with the local village assemblies (‘Gram Sabhas’) in Joint Forest Management 
Committees (Aggarwal et al. 2009: 7; Prip and Wallbott 2014: 25-26). Despite their obligation 
to share forest revenues with local communities, states were often successful in capturing 
the benefits. “Joint Forest Management” has hence been criticized as a top-down approach, 
which fails to substantially involve local communities (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24). 
During the government led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, climate change was put on 
India’s domestic agenda in 2007. In this year, the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate 
Change put forward a National Action Plan for Climate Change in 2008 (Atteridge 2013: 63, 
65). The action plan prepared the ground for the National Mission for a Green India of 2010, 
which aspires to increase India’s forest cover to one-third of the total land area by investing 
US$ 8.5 billion (GOI 2008: 34; Prip and Wallbott 2014: 30). The Green India Mission 
envisaged an increased authority for the ‘Gram Sabhas’ as the new overseers of Joint Forest 
Management Committees (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24; India (MOEF) 2010: 26, 41). In 
addition to the empowerment of local institutions, national and state institutions have also 
been assigned authorities, showing a continuing role for the higher tiers. 
The central government envisioned that a majority of the mission’s activities could qualify for 
REDD+ and was hoping to become financially rewarded by external donors (Vijge and Gupta 
2014: 19). Therefore, the mission stipulated the setting up of a so-called REDD+ cell in the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests in order to develop a REDD+ strategy and pilor projects, 
as well as to provide support to national and sub-national institutions (India (MOEF) 2010: 
36). As it was only staffed with one official, it is not clear whether it can fulfill its tasks (Prip 
and Wallbott 2014: 30). In 2014, the central government adopted a REDD+ Reference 
Document and published a Draft National Policy on REDD+. While this Document is 
highlighting the importance of sub-national empowerment, the Draft National Policy on 
REDD+ puts a strong emphasis on institutional strengthening at the national level. 
India has not yet received any grants from multilateral REDD+ funds like the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility. The central government has not been interested in REDD+ readiness 
support from donors as it has perceived itself as already being prepared for global REDD+ 
implementation flows. As a result, REDD+ activities on the ground have remained very 
limited (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 20-22; Prip and Wallbott 2014: 31). 
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Although India’s forest governance is often presented as one of the best examples of 
decentralized forest management in the world (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 23), it is apparent that 
in 2005, India’s forest governance was still not decentralized to the local level. By 2015, the 
picture has lightly changed as decentralizing approaches have gained more momentum with 
the introduction of the Forest Rights Act and the empowerment of the ‘Gram Sabhas’ by the 
Green India Mission. However, such a decentralization has often not happened on the 
ground due to reluctance by state governments (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24). In the future, 
India’s forest governance may become even more centralized again, as the proposed Draft 
National Policy on REDD+ is envisaging a strong authority for the central government, while 
only minor roles for the state governments and no responsibility for the local level. 
 
City Governance in India 
In 1992, the 73th and the 74th Amendment of the Constitution recognized for the first time 
local governments as India’s third governmental tier, which often were prior to that acting as 
states’ implementation agencies (Fisher 2014: 159; Heller et al. 2007: 628). It recommended 
the transfer of 18 state functions to the local level in land use and development planning, 
waste, and infrastructure (Nandi and Gamkhar 2013: 56; Fisher 2014: 159). However, the 
amendments did not envisage the devolution of financial powers to the local governments. 
Furthermore, states were given the right to decide over the extent of power devolution. Over 
time, this has left many cities without sufficient authority and resources (Nandi and Gamkhar 
2013: 56-57; Chu 2016: 284). 
In 2007, the central government under the leadership of the Prime Minister Singh started to 
engage in climate change by introducing a top-down climate action plan (Atteridge 2013: 58, 
60, 67). The plan includes eight national ‘missions’ in various policy areas, such as 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable habitat, which are directed towards the 
development needs of India, while also addressing climate change (GOI 2008: 13). As the 
central government is highly dependent on the state’s actions for realizing the missions (Chu 
2016: 284), it mandated them to develop State Action Plans on Climate Change in 2009 
(Dubash and Jogesh 2014: 1). By end of 2014, however, only nine states possessed an 
endorsed action plan, while 27 states and four union territories had only produced draft plans 
(Nachmany et al. 2015: 5-6). While the National Capital Territory of Delhi already presented 
an action plan in 2009 (Hughes 2013: 48; ICLEI 2014), Mumbai’s State of Maharashtra has 
not yet presented one (Alankar 2015: 8). 
Despite the priority for economic development and the strong role of central and state 
governments in urban and climate governance (Beermann et al. 2016: 6, 8), five Indian cities 
are already C40 members, although none of them has implemented any C40 project so far. 
While Delhi as a long-standing C40 member is the only city, which is associated with a C40 
initiative in the field of measurement and planning (C40 2016b), the other long lasting 
member Mumbai has only been linked to a completely private project financed by the Clinton 
Climate Initiative in one of its suburbs in 2008 (C40 2011). The other three Indian C40 
member cities – Bengaluru, Jaipur, and Kolkata – have only joined the network in 2015 and 
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are mostly inactive (C40 2015c; C40 2015b; C40 2015f). In its INDC of 2015, the central 
government envisages plenty of development actions, which shall contribute to mitigating 
climate change as well, and which will largely take place in urban areas. However, its 
governance structure stipulates a strengthened role of the central government in urban 
development politics (Phadke and Waghmode 2016). Only two out of five Indian C40 cities 
(New Delhi and Jaipur) have been chosen by the central government to be among the first 
20 cities to participate in the mission (The Hindu 2016). 
During the past decade, climate action has been introduced in a top-down manner by the 
central government. Authority on climate change has also increased at the state level, while 
the city level has mostly been left out in the national framework. However, the amount of 
Indian C40 members has increased significantly in 2015, pointing perhaps to an increased 
future role of the network in India. Climate action in cities may be strengthened locally in the 
future as well, as India’s INDC envisages various measures in urban areas. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As our discussion has shown, the academic debate on the effects of globally operating 
carbon governance arrangements is based on weak empirical foundations. We know very 
little about the supposed ‘reconfiguration of authority’ within the nation-state and their public 
administrations. In our research, we have proposed a way to operationalize this term and 
developed an approach that takes the devolution of decision-making and expenditure 
authorities from central to regional and/or local government as a proxy for the evaluation of 
the changing patterns of authority in developing countries. We have focused our research on 
two stylized carbon governance arrangements: one that operates top-down REDD+ and 
another that operates bottom-up TCNs. Departing from our conceptual assumptions that the 
former is likely to lead to more centralization and the latter to more decentralization within the 
field of environmental policy-making, we have presented some preliminary findings from our 
desk studies on Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. 
Our case studies indicated that there are no easily detectable patterns. Each country case 
has a specific historic constitutional and political background that strongly influences, and 
sets the pace for, the way in which current climate policies are carried out. However, two 
findings from our empirical analysis stand out: First, there are very mixed results when it 
comes to the impact of TNCs. Despite the fact that cities in all countries have been quite 
active in climate change initiatives, we have found little evidence in our desk studies that the 
C40 Group has significantly influenced the way in which climate policies are carried out in the 
countries under investigation. Consequently, we have not found evidence for a stronger 
decentralization in the field of environmental policy-making. This does not mean, however, 
that there is no such influence and that urban policy elites operate in a void and 
independently from their national environment. Nevertheless, the research tools we have 
employed so far for our desk analyses may be way too weak to ascertain such processes in 
public policy-making. 
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Second, in all case study countries the role of sub-national governments in the forestry 
sector has either been weak historically (and despite constitutional mandates), such as in 
India and South Africa, or there have been recent shifts towards a gradual (re-)centralization 
of forest policies. These changes are particularly evident in decentralized Indonesia as well 
as in federalized Brazil. Interestingly, both countries have (had) high levels of deforestation 
and have therefore received a lot of international attention. They have also been heavily 
involved in REDD+ activities, with much guidance from the national government and their 
central administration. We do not know precisely whether (and to what extent) REDD+ 
activities may have influenced such trends, but there are a number of indications suggesting 
that international donors expected a consistent REDD+ approach by recipient countries and 
therefore a functional centralization in this particular area. We will need to follow up these 
processes more closely and with more sophisticated research tools in our field studies in 
Brazil, Indonesia, India and South Africa in the upcoming months. 
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